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Stephenson v. Rowe: The Testator's Will Prevails
No two areas of law are more rooted in tradition and less subject to change
than the law of property and the law of wills.' Thus, any change in state law
that deals with transfer of land by wills is worth noting. North Carolina law has
recently undergone such a change.2 For a transfer of land to be valid, regardless
of whether the transfer is by deed or by will, the parcel of land to be transferred
had to be described adequately in the instrument so that anyone looking at the
record will be able to tell exactly what parcel is being transferred. 3 If the de-
scription is not definite enough, the transfer is considered void for vagueness. 4
Traditionally, the requirements for wills have not been as strict as those for
deeds. 5 Until recently, however, North Carolina applied the same test for both
wills and deeds. 6 This rule has now been changed.
In Stephenson v. Rowe 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that a
description of property in a will is not subject to the same requirements of defi-
niteness that must be satisfied for valid transfers of property by deed; rather,
property can be transferred by will with a less exact description.8 The court also
adopted a new remedy for situations in which the testator devises a specified
number of acres out of a larger tract.9 The court held that in such a situation
the devisee of the property has an implied power to make a reasonable selection
of the specified number of acres from the larger tract if the devisee has a close
relationship with the testator or the property.10 This Note examines this change
in the law in light of the history of the law of wills, both in this country and in
England. It concludes that the supreme court acted correctly in relaxing the
definiteness requirement for description of property in wills and in adopting the
remedy of allowing qualified devisees to choose the property of the devise.
Aaron William Rowe died on April 28, 1981.11 At his death he owned a
164 acre tract of land.12 In his will Rowe first directed that all debts and burial
expenses be paid from the estate.13 He then devised to his wife, Lucille Jones
1. See, eg., Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 54-55, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788 (1982) (policy of courts
not to change matters involving title to real property); 1 N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRA-
TION oF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 1-6 (2d ed. 1983) (tracing history of law of wills from
English roots).
2. See Stephenson v. Rowe, 315 N.C. 330, 339, 338 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1986).
3. See 3. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 183 (rev. ed.
1981); 1 N. WIGGINS, supra note 1, § 138. In North Carolina deeds this requirement is usually met
by giving an ascertainable beginning point, and then the bearings and distances of the boundary lines
of the tract. J. WEBSTER, supra, § 184.
4. 1 N. WIGGINS, supra note 1, § 138.
5. 4 W. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.2, at 8 (W. Bowe & D. Parker eds. 1961).
6. See Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 291, 10 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1940).
7. 315 N.C. 330, 338 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
8. Id. at 335, 338 S.E.2d at 304.
9. Id. at 337, 340, 338 S.E.2d at 305, 307.
10. Id. at 339-40, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
11. Id. at 331, 338 S.E.2d at 302.
12. Id.
13. Last Will and Testament of Aaron William Rowe, Record at 5, Stephenson (No. 515A84).
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Rowe, "the home place occupied by us at the time of my death, together with
thirty (30) acres of real estate immediately surrounding the home place, to be
hers in fee simple, absolutely and forever."' 14 After making further specific be-
quests of funds from savings accounts and life insurance proceeds, and providing
for payment of administration expenses, Rowe devised and bequeathed "all of
the remainder of my residuary estate, ... and any and all property of whatsoever
kind or description, to my wife, Lucille Jones Rowe, in trust for her and for my
seven children,... who are to share equally." 15 All the children were from a
prior marriage;16 four were minors at the time of Aaron's death. 17 The will
named Lucille Rowe executrix and gave her "absolute power to deal with any
property, real or personal, held in my estate or in trust, as freely as I might in
the handling of my own affairs," including "full and complete power.., to sell,
exchange, assign, transfer and convey any... property... held in my estate,
and to hold said funds for the purposes herein enumerated."
18
In May 1981 Lucille Rowe had a surveyor lay off thirty acres of land that
immediately surrounded the residence occupied by Aaron and Lucille Rowe at
the time of Aaron's death. 19 The residence was located near the center of the
tract,20 and the boundaries of the tract coincided with a partially completed split
rail fence surrounding the residence.2 1 Aaron Rowe had purchased enough split
railing to go around thirty acres prior to his death, but had installed only part of
it.22 Acting in her capacity as executrix, Lucille Rowe deeded the thirty acres to
herself individually. 23
Aaron Rowe's former wife, acting as guardian ad litem for the miftor chil-
dren, and his other children brought suit against Lucille Rowe claiming that the
devise of thirty acres failed for vagueness, and thus the entire 164 acres should
be included in the residuary trust.24 Lucille Rowe responded that the devise was
not void for vagueness and that the deed to herself was within her authority
under the will. 25 Both parties moved for summary judgement. 26 The trial court
held that the devise of thirty acres under the will did not fail and Lucille Rowe
had good title to the thirty-acre tract as a matter of law.27 Because it found no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court granted Lucille Rowe's motion for
summary judgment.28
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 331, 338 S.E.2d at 302.
17. Id. at 330, 338 S.E.2d at 301.
18. Record at 8, Stephenson.
19. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 332, 338 S.E.2d at 302.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 340, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
22. Id. at 331, 338 S.E.2d at 302.
23. Id. at 332, 338 S.E.2d at 303.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 332-33, 338 S.E.2d at 303.
27. Id. at 333, 338 S.E.2d at 303.
28. Id.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals, relying on Hodges v. Stewart,29 a
1940 case, vacated and remanded.3 0 The court recognized that this result was
contrary to the testator's intent, but concluded it was bound by precedent. 31
Judge Becton dissented, however, reasoning that Hodges was wrongly decided
and that the testator's intent should prevail.32 The Hodges court held that a
devise of a specified number of acres out of a larger tract was void for vague-
ness,33 but relied on cases dealing with deeds, mortgages, and foreclosures rather
than wills.34 North Carolina cases prior to Hodges that dealt with wills upheld
such devises. 35 Furthermore, cases in other jurisdictions dealing with the same
issue have held such devises valid.36 For these reasons, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Stephenson overruled Hodges, reversed the court of appeals'
decision, and reinstated the opinion of the trial court.37 In addition to overrul-
ing Hodges, the court also held that the testator had intended the devisee to have
the power to make a reasonable selection of the specific acreage from the larger
tract even though he had not expressly granted this power to the devisee.
38
North Carolina courts never applied this remedy prior to this case.39
When courts construe a will they are attempting to give effect to the actual
intent of the testator. 40 The testator's intent has been called the" 'polar star'"
that guides the courts.4 1 However, the courts must determine the testator's in-
tent from the will itself, and the language of the will cannot be contradicted by
extrinsic evidence. 42 Over time the courts have developed canons of construc-
tion to aid in making this determination, 43 but they are limited in carrying out
the testator's intent by rules of law fixed by statute and court decisions. 44 The
rules regarding transfer of property are examples of such rules.
In this case Aaron Rowe's intent to devise thirty acres of land to his wife is
indisputable. 45 The problem is that he did not give a sufficiently definite descrip-
29. 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723 (1940).
30. Stephenson v. Rowe, 69 N.C. App. 717, 723, 318 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C.
330, 338 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
31. Id. at 722, 318 S.E.2d at 327.
32. Id. at 723-24, 318 S.E.2d at 328 (Becton, J., dissenting).
33. Hodges, 218 N.C. at 292, 10 S.E.2d at 724.
34. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 338, 338 S.E.2d at 306.
35. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
36. See cases cited infra note 93.
37. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 339-40, 338 S.E.2d at 306-07.
38. Id. at 340, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
39. Id. at 337, 338 S.E.2d at 305.
40. 4 W. PAGE, supra note 5, § 30.1, at 2.
41. Adcock v. Perry, 305 N.C. 625, 629, 290 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1982) (quoting Wing v. Wacho-
via Bank & Trust Co., 301 N.C. 456, 463, 272 S.E.2d 90, 95 (1980)).
42. 4 W. PAGE, supra note 5, § 30.2, at 6.
43. See White v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 251 F. Supp. 155, 159 (M.D.N.C. 1966). Some
of the canons of construction are that the courts cannot contradict the language within the four
comers of the will, all provisions of the will must be construed as a whole with all parts of the will
indicating an intelligent purpose, and the testator is presumed to have used the words in their ordi-
nary sense. Id.
44. Dearman v. Bruns, I1 N.C. App. 564, 565, 181 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1971), cert. denied, 279
N.C. 394, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971).
45. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 335, 338 S.E.2d at 304.
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tion of the property to be conveyed.46 In a deed such an omission would be
fatal.47 Wills, however, generally are construed more liberally than deeds for
several reasons. In a deed there generally are two parties to the contract, and
something of value is given in exchange for the land. The parties are therefore
relying on the language of the deed and should be bound by the objective mean-
ing of the words used.4 8 In a will, however, no value is given for what is re-
ceived, and no reliance is placed on the will by an adverse party. Because no
reason exists to restrict construction of a will to the objective meaning of the
instrument, the courts are more willing to construe the will to reflect the testa-
tor's subjective intent.49
More practical reasons also exist for treating wills more liberally than
deeds. If the grantor makes a mistake in a deed, it can be corrected because both
parties are still living, but the testator who makes a mistake in a will is not
available to correct the mistake.50 Also, in a deed it is presumed that the gran-
tor intends to convey a specific piece of property, and the transfer is therefore
void if the specific piece of property cannot be determined.5 1 The testator, on
the other hand, may very well intend to transfer a portion of his or her property
without having a specific piece of property in mind.
5 2
Prior to Hodges North Carolina cases held that devises of a specified
number of acres out of a larger tract were valid even though such a transfer
would be considered void if done by deed. In Harvey v. Harvey,53 an 1895 case,
the court upheld two devises of 250 acres from a 705 acre tract.5 4 The court had
"some difficulty" in overcoming the objection that the devises were void for
vagueness, but "[u]pon consideration" decided to uphold the gifts in order to
give effect to the intent of the testator.5 5 The court treated the devisees as ten-
ants in common.56 Likewise, in Wright v. Harris5 7 a devise to a former servant
of 50 acres out of a 1200 acre tract was upheld. The court stated, "[t]he plaintiff
ought to have recognized the right of the defendant, under the will, to fifty
acres," and because he did not do so the devisee was allowed to remain on the
fifty acres he was occupying.58 In Caudle v. Caudle59 several devises of acreage,
one of which was to include "the old home place where [the testator] now lives,"
were upheld, and the devisees were treated as tenants in common of the entire
46. Id.
47. J. WEBSTER, supra note 3, §§ 192, 199.
48. 4 W. PAGE, supra note 5, § 30.2, at 8.
49. Id.
50. Stephenson, 69 N.C. App. at 723-24, 318 S.E.2d at 328 (Becton, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 724, 318 S.E.2d at 328 (Becton, ., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. 72 N.C. 570 (1895).
54. Id. at 571, 574.
55. Id. at 573-74. The court gave no reason for its decision other than attempting to uphold the
intent of the testator. Id.
56. Id. at 573.
57. 116 N.C. 462, 21 S.E. 914 (1895).
58. Id. at 465, 21 S.E. at 914. The court relied on Harvey to uphold the devise without giving
any further reasoning. Id.
59. 159 N.C. 53, 74 S.E. 631 (1912).
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tract.6° The court noted that if the will had left one-fifth of a tract of land to
each devisee, the devise would clearly be valid and the devisees would be treated
as tenants in common to the property. 61 By analogy to this situation, the court
concluded that devisees of a specified number of acres from a larger tract should
be treated as tenants in common with their interests coinciding to the fractional
part of the whole that the devised number of acres gave to each. 62
In 1940 the supreme court made an abrupt shift from the position taken in
these earlier cases. In Hodges v. Stewart63 the testator left "twenty-five acres of
the home tract of land including the building and out houses" to his son.64 The
devise was to come from a tract consisting of eighty-two acres that the testator
owned at death. 65 This case was analogous to Harvey, Wright, and Caudle on its
facts, but the court held the devise to be void for vagueness without even men-
tioning those cases.66 The court simply stated:
The principle is firmly established in our law that a conveyance of land
by deed or will must set forth a subject matter, either certain within
itself or capable of being made certain by recurrence to something ex-
trinsic to which the instrument refers. It is essential to the validity of a
devise of land that the land be described with sufficient definiteness and
certainty to be located and distinguished from other land.6 7
Of eleven cases the court cited in support of this proposition, none dealt with
devises of land by will.68 Eight of the cases involved transfer of land by deed,69
two involved mortgages, 70 and one dealt with a complaint in a tax foreclosure
suit.7 1 The court cited two more cases for the proposition that once the law
renders an attempted devise void, it cannot be used as evidence of the testator's
60. Id. at 54, 74 S.E. at 631.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723 (1940).
64. Id. at 291, 10 S.E.2d at 724.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 291-92, 10 S.E.2d at 724.
69. See North Carolina Self Help Corp. v. Brinkley, 215 N.C. 615, 619, 2 S.E.2d 889, 892
(1939) (deed that does not contain a description either certain in itself or capable of being made
certain by extrinsic evidence held invalid); Katz v. Daughtrey, 198 N.C. 393, 394, 151 S.E. 879, 880
(1930) (deed that attempted to convey 25 acres of a 50 acre tract without boundaries or beginning
point void for vagueness); Higdon v. Howell, 167 N.C. 455, 456, 83 S.E. 807, 807 (1914) (deed
conveying 200 acres on waters of Savannah Creek void for uncertainty); Beard v. Taylor, 157 N.C.
440, 442, 73 S.E. 213, 214 (1911) (sheriff's deed for part of tract void because it gave no means for
part to be divided); Cathey v. Buchanan Lumber Co. 151 N.C. 592, 595, 66 S.E. 580, 581 (1909)
(deed attempting to convey 324 acres of a 724 acre tract void); Smith v. Proctor, 139 N.C. 314, 318,
51 S.E. 889, 890 (1905) (deed purporting to cut 40 acres from a larger tract but giving no way to
locate the dividing line void); Kennedy v. Maness, 138 N.C. 35, 36-37, 50 S.E. 450, 451 (1905) (deed
giving distances of boundary lines, but not bearings held void for indefiniteness); Deaver v. Jones,
114 N.C. 649, 652-53, 19 S.E. 637, 638 (1894) (description that gives no way to locate five succeeding
comers void for uncertainty).
70. See Bissette v. Strickland, 191 N.C. 260, 262, 131 S.E. 655, 656 (1926) (description in mort-
gage making reference to adjoining owners held sufficient to admit parol evidence to identify land);
Harris v. Woodard, 130 N.C. 580, 580-81, 41 S.E. 790, 791 (1902) (description in mortgage seeking
to convey three out of forty acres void for indefiniteness).
71. See Johnston County v. Stewart, 217 N.C. 334, 336, 7 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1940) (description
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intent,72 but these were cases dealing with the formalities necessary to execute a
will, rather than the requirement of a definite description for the transfer of
property.7 3 In short, the Hodges court seems to have been unaware of prior
cases that were on point and to have misapplied the cases on which it did rely.74
The court simply made a mistake. It apparently did not understand the funda-
mental differences between deeds and wills.
75
Hodges has been cited in later opinions for the proposition that the descrip-
tion of property must be sufficiently definite for the transfer to be valid, but the
cases in which it has been cited have generally dealt with deeds, deeds of trust,
and contracts to convey land.7 6 A few cases involving wills have relied on
Hodges for the proposition that the intent of the testator must be determined by
the language used in the will and that the court cannot deviate from that lan-
guage.77 Prior to Stephenson, however, only four opinions dealing with ques-
tions of sufficiency of description in wills cited Hodges.
78
In Burchett v. Mason 7 9 the court seemed to assume that Caudle and Hodges
were not inconsistent, stating that, "the will... is controlled by the principles
announced in Caudle... [and] also in Hodges."'80 The court ultimately decided
the case on grounds other than those dealing with sufficiency of description,
however, so it did not discuss that issue.81 In Redd v. Taylor8 2 the court held
in complaint saying only "4 lots lying and being in Banner Township, Johnston County" too indefi-
nite to constitute basis for tax foreclosure judgement).
72. Hodges, 218 N.C. at 292, 10 S.E.2d at 724.
73. McGehee v. McGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 563-65, 127 S.E. 684, 686-87 (1925) (when formali-
ties not sufficient for probate in South Carolina, which was place of death, but formalities sufficient
in North Carolina where real property located, real property passes under will, and personal prop-
erty passes by intestacy); Melchor v. Burger, 21 N.C. 634, 635-36 (1837) (when formalities not
sufficient to devise real property, will may still be effective as to personal property).
74. Poor work by the attorneys may explain why the court was unaware of earlier cases on
point. The Appellants' brief does not include Wright, Harvey, or Caudle. See Brief of Defendants at
6, Hodges (No. 238). The brief mentions only one case on this point, Blanton v. Boney, 175 N.C.
211, 95 S.E. 361 (1918). See Brief of Defendants at 6, Hodges. Blanton states that a description
which merely says 40 acres to include the house "is certainly sufficient to pass the land," but goes on
to say that even if the devise was void, the same result would follow under the intestacy statute.
Blanton, 175 N.C. at 212, 95 S.E. at 361. The Hodges court apparently was not persuaded by this
one case that had two alternative reasons for its holding.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
76. See, eg., Baldwin v. Hinton, 243 N.C. 113, 119, 90 S.E.2d 316, 320 (1955) (deed of trust
that included about 10.5 acres more or less and refers to a will held invalid); Searcy v. Logan, 226
N.C. 562, 565, 39 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1946) (dealing with definiteness of description in contract to
convey land); Thompson v. Umberger 221 N.C. 178, 180, 19 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1942) (dealing with
sufficiency of description of an alleyway in a deed).
77. See, eg., Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 162, 116 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1960); Shoemaker v.
Coats, 218 N.C. 251, 258, 10 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1940) (Stacy, C.J., concurring).
78. See Redd v. Taylor, 270 N.C. 14, 24, 153 S.E.2d 761, 768 (1967); Burchett v. Mason, 233
N.C. 306, 308, 63 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1951); Taylor v. Taylor, 45 N.C. App. 449, 454, 263 S.E.2d 351,
354, rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 357, 271 S.E.2d 506 (1980); Cable v. Hardin Oil Co., 10 N.C.
App. 569, 576, 179 S.E.2d 829, 833, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 521, 180 S.E.2d 863 (1971).
79. 233 N.C. 306, 63 S.E.2d 634 (1951).
80. Id. at 308, 63 S.E.2d at 636.
81. Id. The court held that because plaintiffs had participated in a proceeding to sell timber
and distributed the proceeds from the sale according to their interests under the will, they had
aquiesced in the will and were estopped from questioning its validity. Id. at 307-08, 63 S.E.2d at
635-36.
82. 270 N.C. 14, 153 S.E.2d 761 (1967).
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that a devise of "the part of the farm on Albemarle Road that [the devisees]
want in fee simple" was valid.8 3 The court distinguished Hodges, reasoning that
the devise in Redd referred to a definite piece of property, the property the devi-
sees had indicated they wanted at the time of the execution of the will.8 4 The
court could then take extrinsic evidence to determine exactly which portion was
intended to be devised. 85
In Cable v. Hardin Oil Co. 86 the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a
devise of "25 acres to be selected by [the devisee] .... -S The court distin-
guished Hodges because there was a power of selection expressly granted to the
devisee in Cable, and no power of selection was granted in Hodges.88 Finally, in
Taylor v. Taylor89 the court of appeals, relying on Hodges, struck down a devise
of "[the testator's] home and 30 acres of land surrounding the same" to the
testator's wife and two devises of twelve acres to the testator's two brothers. 90
Judge Martin dissented, however, for the express purpose of giving the supreme
court a chance to reconsider Hodges.91 The supreme court reversed Taylor on
other grounds without reaching the Hodges issue.92 Not once since Hodges was
handed down has the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on Hodges to hold
that a devise of a specified number of acres out of a larger tract was void for
vagueness, and the only court of appeals case prior to Stephenson that did so was
reversed on other grounds. Other states that have dealt with this issue have
uniformly held such devises valid. 93
In Stephenson the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hodges for
three reasons: (1) Hodges relied on cases that dealt with inter vivos conveyances
rather than devises in wills; (2) it was contrary to earlier North Carolina cases
that dealt with similar devises; and (3) it was not in line with cases on the subject
in other jurisdictions. 94 The court thus held that a devise of a specified number
of acres from a larger tract of land is valid even though it does not contain a
description that identifies a particular portion of the larger tract. 95
Once such a devise is upheld, however, the question remains how to identify
exactly what portion of the larger tract will be transferred to the devisee. Three
ways of making this determination have been developed. The first is to permit
83. Id. at 23-24, 153 S.E.2d at 768.
84. Id. at 24, 153 S.E.2d at 768.
85. Id.
86. 10 N.C. App. 569, 179 S.E.2d 829 (1971).
87. Id. at 570, 179 S.E.2d at 830.
88. Id. at 576, 179 S.E.2d at 833.
89. 45 N.C. App. 449, 263 S.E.2d 351, rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 357, 271 S.E.2d 506(1980).
90. Id. at 450, 454, 263 S.E.2d at 352, 354.
91. Id. at 455, 263 S.E.2d at 354-55 (Martin, J., dissenting).
92. Taylor v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 357, 365-66, 271 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1980). Because the widow
had dissented from the will, the court held that she had given up any right to challenge a devise
under the will. Id. at 364, 271 S.E.2d at 511.
93. See, e-g., Baumhauer v. Jones, 224 Ala. 484, 140 So. 425 (1932); Argo v. Irwin-Union Trust
Co., 92 Ind. App. 676, 173 N.E. 333 (1930); Churchill v. Churchill, 67 S.W. 265 (Ky. 1902).
94. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 339, 338 S.E.2d at 306.
95. Id. at 340, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
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extrinsic evidence to show which portion of the property fits the description in
the will. In Fulwood v. Fulwood9 6 extrinsic evidence was allowed to show which
property was the "homestead tract."' 97 The North Carolina Supreme Court rea-
soned that a devise of "the homestead tract" created a latent ambiguity under
the will and that evidence was then necessary to resolve that ambiguity and
identify which of the testator's land was the homestead tract.98 Similarly, in
Boddie v. Bond 99 extrinsic evidence was admitted to show what property con-
tained "the house where we now live, with all the outhouses and premises, em-
bracing the peach and apple orchard."' 0 0 And in Redd the court allowed
evidence which showed that "the part of the Farm on the Albemarle Road that
[the devisees] want" was a tract of land they had been leasing and had offered to
buy on several occasions.101
The second way of dealing with a devise of a portion of the property is to
treat the devisees as tenants in common with interests in proportion to the
amount of property that they took under the will. In Harvey the testator devised
to one son, "two hundred and fifty acres of land including the buildings whereon
[the testator] now [occupies]," to another son "two hundred and fifty acres of
land including the buildings which the said [son] now occupies," and the residue
to other named parties.10 2 The court regarded the sons and residuary devisees
as tenants in common of the entire tract.10 3 Similarly, in Caudle the testator
devised sixty acres to one daughter, forty acres to each of two other daughters,
one hundred twenty-five acres to one son, and eighty-two acres to the other son
including "the old home place where [the testator] now [lives]."' 1 4 The court
held that the devisees were to be treated as tenants in common with no restric-
tion except that the one devisee should have the home place on his eighty-two
acres.105 The Caudle court noted that if the devisees could not agree on a parti-
tion and did not wish to continue as tenants in common, then they had the
remedy available of applying to the courts for partition of the property.10 6
The third way of dealing with this problem is to find the testator intended
that the devisee have a power to make a reasonable selection of a portion of the
larger tract, even though the testator did not explicitly grant such power. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that when the testator explicitly
grants such a power to the devisee, then the devise is upheld.' 0 7 Prior to Ste-
phenson, however, the North Carolina courts had never been willing to find such
96. 161 N.C. 601, 77 S.E. 763 (1913).
97. Id. at 602, 77 S.E. at 764.
98. Id.
99. 158 N.C. 204, 73 S.E. 988 (1912).
100. Id. at 205, 73 S.E. at 989.
101. Redd, 270 N.C. at 20, 23, 153 S.E.2d at 765, 767.
102. Harvey, 72 N.C. at 571.
103. Id. at 573.
104. Caudle, 159 N.C. at 54, 74 S.E. at 631.
105. Id. at 54-55, 74 S.E. at 631.
106. Id. at 55, 74 S.E.2d at 631.
107. Cable v. Hardin Oil Co., 10 N.C. App. 569, 575-76, 179 S.E.2d 829, 833, cert. denied, 278
N.C. 521, 180 S.E.2d 863 (1971).
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a power when it was not explicitly granted.108
Courts in both the United States and England have been willing to make
such a finding. In Hobson v. Blackburn 109 the testator devised a house and "ten
acres of land or thereabouts adjoining, or immediately surrounding the
same," 110 and the presiding judge stated that it was "a principle of law, that
where a grant was general of ten acres adjoining or surrounding a house, part of
a larger quantity, the choice of such ten acres ... was in the grantee .... -"11
The English courts thus developed the implied power of selection as a means of
saving such devises. This English principle was imported to the United
States. 112 In Prater v. Hughston 113 the Alabama Supreme Court found that the
devisees were the "primary objects of [the testator's] bounty" because she sought
to take care of them first under her will before disposing of the rest of her estate
through the residuary clause.1 14 Applying the English rule, the court held that
the devisees were intended to have a right of selection.' 15 This rule, reasoned
the court, was the best way to effectuate the intent of the testator. 116 Courts
have also found an implied power of selection when the devisee was the testa-
tor's widow 17 and when the devisees were the testator's children." 8 This
power is not absolute, however. The Alabama Supreme Court required that the
right "must be exercised in a fair and reasonable way, not purely arbitrary and
capricious or fanciful." 11 9 The power has been held subject to the supervision of
the courts "so as to make each tract a compact body with straight lines for
boundaries, and to be in proportionate value according to the equities of the
situation." 1 20
In Stephenson the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted this remedy,
finding that the devisee had an implied grant of power under the will to make a
reasonable selection of the desired property.' 2' The court stated:
[Ain intent on the part of a testator to give the devisee the power to
make a reasonable selection of the tract is usually found in those cases
where the devisee is the primary beneficiary, or principal object of the
108. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 337, 338 S.E.2d at 305.
109. 39 Eng. Rep. 797 (1833).
110. Id. at 798.
111. Id. at 799.
112. See, e.g., Lore v. Stiles, 25 N.J. Eq. 381, 383 (1874) (applying English cases to find a right of
selection); In re Turner's Will, 206 N.Y. 93, 96-99, 99 N.E. 187, 188-89 (1912) (applying English
cases to find right of selection).
113. 202 Ala. 192, 79 So. 564 (1918).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 193, 79 So. at 565.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Youmans v. Youmans, 26 N.J. Eq. 149, 152-53 (1875) (when widow had power to
select property and did not exercise it prior to transfer of her interest, grantor had power to select).
118. See Horn v. Peek, 246 Ala. 241, 243, 20 So. 2d 234, 235 (1944); In re Turner's Will, 206
N.Y. 93, 99, 99 N.E. 187, 189 (1912).
119. Baumhauer v. Jones, 224 Ala. 484, 486, 140 So. 425, 427 (1932) (when devise was a tract
containing 300 feet of front and extending full depth of property, selection of tract roughly in shape
of parallelogram and with straight boundary lines was considered reasonable).
120. Horn v. Peek, 246 Ala. 241, 243, 20 So. 2d 234, 235-36 (1944).
121. Stephenson, 315 N.C. at 340, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
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testator's bounty, or is in such relationship with the testator or the
devised property itself that it is reasonable to infer the testator in-
tended the devisee to have the power of reasonable selection.122
Because Lucille Rowe was the testator's widow, the primary beneficiary of his
will, and the principal object of his bounty, and because she and the testator had
worked together on their home, the court reasoned that "both testator and Lu-
cille Rowe knew precisely what metes and bounds would be necessary to lay off
30 acres 'immediately surrounding' their home; and testator knew that Lucille
Rowe was, therefore, capable of making the mutually desired selection."' 123 The
court found the selection she made clearly reasonable because the Rowes' home
was almost exactly in the center of the selected tract. 124 Lucille Rowe was thus
acting within her power and within her rights when she deeded the house and
thirty acres to herself.125 This result is exactly what Aaron Rowe intended. 126
By overruling Hodges the supreme court corrected a mistake that had been
made in the past and made it possible to uphold devises that formerly would
have failed. Thus, North Carolina courts are now better able to effectuate the
intent of the testator, rather than being required to strike down a devise that
there is little reason for invalidating. This result is much more in line with the
purpose of the will, which is to allow a testator to control the disposition of his
or her property at death. Likewise, by finding that a devisee who has a special
relationship to the testator is empowered to make a reasonable selection of the
desired property, the court has expanded its power to follow the "polar star" of
the testator's intent. Such a devisee is likely to know what property the testator
intended to transfer and is thus able to take what the testator intended the devi-
see to have.
The requirement that the selection be reasonable, and the fact it is subject
to supervision by the courts, will protect the interests of other takers under the
will, while at the same time giving the courts flexibility in interpreting the will.
If the devisee does not have such a special relationship to the testator or to the
property, or if the selection made is not reasonable, then the courts can still fall
back on the other available remedies by either holding all takers of the property
as tenants in common or taking extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent if such
evidence is appropriate. Both of these remedies, however, require time and ef-
fort from both the court and the parties involved. When the power of selection
is appropriate, it is more convenient and efficient for everyone concerned.
The North Carolina Supreme Court was correct in overruling Hodges and
in adopting the remedy of allowing certain devisees to make a reasonable selec-
tion of property when the will only specifies a certain number of acres from a
larger tract. The court should be commended for recognizing and correcting a
122. Id. at 339-40, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
123. Id. at 340, 338 S.E.2d at 307.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 335, 338 S.E.2d at-304.
1987]
1498 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
mistake in the law and for adopting a new remedy that will give the courts
added flexibility in their quest to give effect to the intent of testators.
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